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ABSTRACT 
Immediately after the fall of the Communist regime, Romania made some timid steps towards 
decentralization. The process has accelerated in 1997-98, with the passing of a new Law on Local 
Public Finance, but there are still many flaws in the functioning of intergovernmental finance. This 
paper focuses on a particular category of transfers − the equalization grants − and highlights the 
achievements and the shortcomings identifiable so far. The analysis is based on budget execution data 
from all local governments of Romania: 41 counties and 2,950 localities (safe for the capital, 
Bucharest, which has a special status and does not receive equalization funds). While many 
conclusions and recommendations are country-specific, some are more general and may apply to other 
transition countries too.  
First, states with weak administration and poor financial discipline should not attempt to implement 
complex redistribution rules or rely on data that are difficult to develop or unreliable. Many times 
second-best solutions should be adopted if they minimize the implementation costs and increase 
transparency and predictability, preventing narrow interest groups from taking advantage of 
intricacies and abuse the system. Simplicity and the daylight are the best disinfectant for public funds.  
Second, the battle lines in the process of decentralization are not always clear-cut, with the good guys 
on one side (local governments) and the bad ones on the other (central government, presumably 
opposing decentralization). Instead, local decision-makers may cherish those aspects of 
decentralization that bring them more resources, but not those that require painful decisions, and 
hence incur political costs. They may prefer a situation when funds keep coming from the center, 
instead of having to raise own resources from the community and pay a political price for it. This is 
important, because many times the analysts assume that local politicians do want more local autonomy 
− which may not be the case.  
Third, local governments are not a monolithic group: different tiers or types of localities may have 
diverging interests when it comes to financial decentralization, and the central government ends up as 
a mediator rather than a player in the process. For example, in Romania’s case, too much discretion 
for county councils in the allocation of funds affects the financial autonomy of localities. A careful 
balance should be found between the legitimate interests of all tiers of government, so that the 
resources match responsibilities and moral hazard or rent seeking situations are avoided.  
Finally, the new democracies should learn that good governance means not only passing legislation, 
but also implementing it, collecting feed back on a steady basis and adjusting the policies whenever 
necessary. Had the Romanian decision-makers done so in the case of intergovernmental equalization, 
they would have noted that the main goal of the whole exercise − i.e. equalization − is often not met. 
Because of its loopholes, the system works erratically and even, in some instances, transfer resources 
from poor communities to rich ones. This paper concludes with a set of recommendations aimed at 
making the Romanian equalization system simpler, more transparent and, as a result, fairer.  
 
                                                
∗ All the data presented in this paper are based on the primary aggregation of financial reports available 
from the Romanian Ministry of Finance. I am particularly indebted to Mr. Marin Cojoc, director in the 
MoF, for kindly providing access to the financial data from local governments. Many points and 
arguments presented in this paper were developed during various discussions with Romanian civil 
servants, and foreign and Romanian independent consultants and academics working in the field of 
local government. I am grateful to all of them, but since their number is large I can only mention here 
two of them, who’s comments were particularly helpful: Francis Conway from the Urban Institute, and 
Tom Spofford from the Research Triangle Institute.  
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1. Introduction 
Like all the other ex-Communist countries Romania started, in early nineties, the 
transition towards democracy and the market economy in a global intellectual 
environment where decentralization and the public sector reform were the words of 
the day. There were many motives why most of the developed and developing nations 
have engaged in decentralization in the last decades: stimulate economic growth, 
reduce urban-rural disparities, deepen democracy and encourage the civil society at 
the local level. All were objectives only partially fulfilled through the previous top-
down policies pursued by the centralized states (Manor, 1999). In other cases, central 
governments wanted simply to get rid of part of the development burden at a time 
when the public sector was facing tighter budgetary constraints, by placing it on the 
shoulder of locally elected politicians. In a way or another, decentralization was seen 
as the right solution to many types of problems. 
However, it was soon discovered that, as it always happen in real life, any policy has 
its own downside. More local autonomy and less central intervention in resource 
allocations lead to increasing disparities among communities. The tolerance towards 
inequality is not very high in the region, given the expectations built into the public in 
the decades of Communism, and the previous centralist tradition of the pre-
Communist states. Inefficiency and corruption can also be decentralized, so that there 
is no guarantee that by simply transferring more attributions and resources to local 
governments the state will function better. On the contrary, the overall public 
spending may increase, creating additional problems for the national macro equilibria. 
Moreover, when designing and promoting decentralization the central government 
officials and experts assume that local decision makers prefer more autonomy and 
self-reliance, rather than less. However, this is not always the case: often local 
officials avoid making use of their full decision-making power, especially when it 
comes to the raising local taxes, if they have the more convenient alternative of 
getting funds from the center without any political costs attached.  
These considerations converge into a more general vision that underpins all the 
proposals outlined in the final part of this paper: in spite of the apparent complexity of 
the equalization system, its design and monitorization cannot be left entirely to 
technical experts. The role of technical expertise in the process of policy making must 
be better understood. Too often, we live in Central and Eastern Europe with the 
impression that each public problem has one right solution, and all we have to do is 
find the best experts in the field – and occasionally, appoint them in positions of 
power – to sort things out. This is naïve and unworkable. Experts, whether they are in 
public institutions or independent, can help by framing the discussion properly, 
identifying and analyzing alternative courses of action, pointing out inconsistencies in 
existing policies, and clarifying options. But ultimately, like in other public policy 
areas, the basic design of the intergovernmental fiscal relations embodies fundamental 
choices that must be made deliberately, by the broader community as much as 
possible in an informed and rational manner. In our case, for example, there are trade-
offs where a decision is needed, such as: how much money should be eventually 
transferred (i.e. how much equality do we want to achieve); or what is the right 
balance between economic efficiency, which may require larger local governments, 
and a higher degree of autonomy in smaller, traditional local units that may be sub-
optimal from the economic point of view. Another trade-off exists between the 
flexibility of fiscal arrangements, allowing adjustments or bailouts by higher-level 
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governments of local communities in need, and the safeguards against discretionary 
political interference or rent-seeking behavior.  
All these considerations must be taken into account when designing the 
intergovernmental financial relations. The equalization grant systems must strike the 
right balance between local autonomy and national solidarity, administrative tradition 
and the new public sector reform requirements, self-interest and external control. 
Unfortunately, it is a rare case when such decisions are taken in a coherent and 
deliberate way. Most often, the system of relations between the tiers of government in 
a country evolve at least in part by default, its structuring being the by-product of 
economic and fiscal decisions that do not follow a deliberate decentralization strategy, 
or the result of institutional struggles among local interest groups. Romania is no 
exception, though some rationality has been instilled into the system with the 1998-99 
reforms.  
This paper analyzes the functioning of the equalization grants in Romania a few 
budgetary cycles after they were introduced. The basic questions are: have they 
actually fulfilled their goal so far – i.e. provide extra resources to the poorest 
communities? And can something be done to improve their effectiveness? The next 
two sections present and discuss the structure and legal framework of local 
governments in Romania, focusing on those elements that influence the equalization 
transfers. Section four analyzes the functions and revenues of local governments, and 
the influence of their assignment on local disparities. Section five evaluates the grants 
system, with its two conceptual components − vertical and horizontal equalization − 
and outlines its current shortcomings. The final section concludes with a blueprint for 
reforms aimed at improving the equalization system, phased over two stages: short 
term and medium term.  
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ASBL − the annual state budget law 
CEE − Central and Eastern Europe 
LG − local government 
LLPF − Law of Local Public Finance 
LLT − Law of Local Taxes 
MoF − Ministry of Finance 
PIT − personal income tax 
VAT − value added tax 
 
2. The Structure of Local Governments in Romania 
The local administration in Romania is organized on two tiers: localities and counties 
(Fig. 2.1). There is no hierarchical administrative subordination between localities, 
counties and the central government, each constituting a component of the public 
sector with full political legitimacy. The ruling bodies of the localities and counties 
are the councils, elected directly every four years. Since both convene only 
periodically, usually not more than 2-3 times per month, they need executive 
structures to oversee the daily operations of local governments. In practice, the 
counties are led on a daily basis by a Standing Delegation elected by the councilors 
from their own ranks, headed by the county president, also elected by the councilors. 
The county presidents exert very much power, formally and informally, since they 
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control the budgets, the appropriations process and human resource policies of the 
executive bodies of the county government, plus, under the current system, a good 
part of the equalization funds distributed to the localities in the respective county.  
The councils of cities, towns and communes elect council chairmen too, but they have 
far less power than the county presidents − actually, they are not part of the executive 
of the local governments proper. Instead, the head of the executive is the mayor, 
elected directly through uninominal vote1 for a term of four years in the same local 
elections, and hence possessing his/her own political legitimacy.  
The only exception from the uniform pattern outlined above is Bucharest, with a 
special − and, in some respects, unclear − status). The capital city does not belong to 
the Ilfov county − which for the purpose of this paper makes little difference, since 
Bucharest does not get equalization funds anyway − and so indirectly enjoys county 
status. On the other hand, it is divided into of six ‘sectors’ with their own elected 
councils and mayors. Each sector has approximately the population of an average 
county, and most of the attributions that are common for large cities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 As a result, there are three ballots in Romanian local elections: party lists for county councils, party 
lists for locality councils, and uninominal ballots for the office of mayor.  
 
 
VOTERS 
Local Councils 
(2,951 localities) 
MAYORS 
(2,951 localities)
County Councils
(41 counties) 
Prefects 
(41 counties) 
Government Parliament 
     Directly elected; political legitimacy 
     Appointed; political control 
Fig. 2.1. Central and local governments (2 tiers) in 
Romania 
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In brief, counties have monolithic government, while localities have dual government 
with the power split between the legislative and executive. In theory each of them is 
independent from the higher-order authorities and accountable only to the citizens. In 
practice the real distribution of powers between tiers of government, or executives 
and legislatures vary a lot, being influenced by the party affiliation of mayors and 
council majorities, their relationship with the prefect, and, last but not least, by the 
personality of mayors and county presidents. Sometimes, especially in the case of 
cities, mayors can be powerful characters who manage to act almost independently 
from their councils, very much in the way a strong British prime minister controls its 
parliament. On the other hand, the real independence of action in local government 
can be constrained by the lack of administrative capability, opaque budgetary 
allocations or interference from the part of the central government. This is usually the 
case in poor rural communes, where mayors and local councils try to build good 
informal relationships with the president of the county council, the prefect or the 
deconcentrated offices of the ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance, in order to 
make their ends meet.  
Paralleling this structure, there is also a number of offices that are not local 
government proper, but nevertheless influence the local policies in general, and the 
equalization process in particular. The prefects are the representatives of the central 
government in territory, acting as coordinators of the ministry branches at the county 
level and heads of the territorial emergency services. They also perform the “legality 
supervision” of the decisions taken by local governments, both at county and locality 
level, which means they can sue LGs in administrative courts whenever they consider 
an act or action undertaken by councils or mayors in their jurisdiction exceeds the 
limits of the Constitution or national laws. In such cases the local decision or action is 
suspended until the court issues a final ruling. Since they are not elected but 
appointed, prefects are not part of the system of local government proper, being an 
impartial instrument of central government’s check over locally elected officials. 
However, since the local elections are held every four years just a few months before 
the general ones, and so the ruling party is likely to have majorities in many county 
councils too, the prefects tend to have close party links with the county councils and 
presidents. As a result, prefects are perceived as officials with a pro-county bias. They 
are more likely to take tougher action against local councils or mayors, especially the 
ones affiliated with an opposition party.  
Some ministries such as Finance, Transportation and Public Works, Agriculture, 
Environment or Home Affairs have offices in territory, typically in county capital 
cities. While all of them have legal attributions in aggregating sectoral policies, some 
are important for the activity of all local governments. The Romanian public 
institutions must keep all their funds in the State Treasury2, which is a unit of the 
Ministry of Finance. The Treasury offices collect and disburse all the funds in / from 
the LGs’ accounts. Moreover, the County Directorates of MoF assist LGs in the 
process of preparing their own budgets, aggregate financial data for reporting 
purposes, collect and allocate the shared national taxes (PIT and VAT). The frequent 
interactions of these MoF branches with the LGs make them important instruments 
into the hand of the central government for exerting informal control over local 
affairs.  
 
                                                
2 Romania has adopted the National Treasury system of unified cash management. 
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3. Sub-national government framework 
By tradition, the modern Romanian state born in the second half of the 19th century 
copied the centralized, uniform structure of the French republic. Most of the time 
since its inception the local governments were organized on two tiers (though there 
were several attempts to create a third tier). But if the details of the administrative 
structure changed several times in the last century and a half, the institutional culture 
in the local government has remained more or less the same: central government’s 
intervention in the local affairs is tacitly accepted, or at least tolerated, especially 
when it comes from the office of the Prefect. Local autonomy has never been as 
strong as in the Central Europe, which was exposed more to the German influence. 
Moreover, since nation- and state-building were top priorities in the 19th century, all 
the other political goals had to be subordinated to the urge to create a modern and 
functional national body politic and bureaucracy. The local needs and agendas were 
seen as secondary and accepted only as long as they did not threaten the interests of 
the broader, national community.  
Therefore, a uniform pattern of the local units was created which, though not totally 
independent of the regional traditions, was meant to serve first of all the functional 
imperatives of the young state. Grassroots democracy has been traditionally weak, 
and all the attributions of the local governments, irrespective of the formal 
constitutional setting, were perceived as mandates or liberties delegated or created by 
the nation state.  
The Communist regime that took over in 1948 operated many changes in the local 
government framework, but found the old arrangements fundamentally convenient for 
its own purposes. Since the local communities were generally accustomed to being 
patronized − and sometime abused − by the central government, they did not represent 
a real obstacle for the new authorities. As a result, when decentralization was 
embarked upon immediately after 1989, being regarded as a mandatory stage on the 
‘road towards Europe’, the historical experience of local self-government was neither 
rich, not very useful in the new context. Creating a functional network of local 
governments turned out to be both a challenge, because of the difficulties, and an 
opportunity, since a new system could be build up from scratch in a coherent manner.  
As it happens in real life, a complex system such as this could not be organized 
entirely rationally. Many decisions that affected the process of decentralization were 
taken by default rather than deliberately, and the final result is sub-optimal. Many 
characteristics that support this conclusion will be discussed further in this material − 
and a good deal of them have to do with the allocation of transfers and the 
equalization grants. But eventually a system did emerge. As far as the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations are concerned, it relies on four main streams of 
legislation: 
• The Law on Local Public Administration (LLPA), adopted in 1991 and amended 
many times afterwards, until it was replaced by a new LLPA in 2001. This piece 
of legislation defines the structure and attributions of the local governments in 
Romania, at both the local and county level. It actually formalizes the return to the 
Romanian sub-national administrative structure from the interwar years3. The 
language is rather general as far as the functions are concerned, enumerating a 
                                                
3 With slightly larger counties: 41 now instead of 60 before World War II within the current borders of 
Romania (or 74 including the ceded territories). 
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long list of attributions and making very few distinctions between the two levels 
of local government.  
• The Law on Local Taxes (LLT), adopted in 1993, and modified in 2002. This act 
established in law the notion of own taxes, controlled and levied by the local 
governments (though the control has never been total). Thus, the property tax 
became the main source of own revenues for the sub-national government in 
Romania. 
• The Law on Local Public Finance (LLPF), adopted in 1998. This act governs the 
system of transfers among tiers of government, the shared taxes, the equalization 
grants and the municipal borrowing issues. In its current form it represents an 
attempt to codify and make more transparent and rule-based the revenue-sharing 
system in Romania. The Annex of the law contains the chart of accounts that must 
be used by local governments in managing their own revenues and expenditures. 
• The Annual State Budget Laws (ASBL), which governs one budgetary cycle (Jan-
Dec) and must be passed by the Parliament before the end of the previous year. 
ASBLs specify the total amount of funds transferred from the central budget to 
local governments in the form of equalization money or conditional grants. It also 
sets the criteria to be used by the Ministry of Finance and counties in the process 
of equalization.  
While in the early ‘90s the ASBL was the focus of local government policy, reflecting 
a high degree of centralization in decision-making and high uncertainty at the local 
level, the situation has gradually changed in time. LLPA and LLT extended 
substantially the local administrative autonomy and created own sources of revenue 
for the local governments. However, many fiscal issues had not been sorted out and 
the predictability of the allocation process remained low. 
Changes in the Local Taxes norms passed in 1997-98 increased LGs' control over 
their own revenues and authorized local councils to administer their own taxes. First, 
monitorization and collection of local taxes were entirely transferred to LGs. Second, 
an automatic formula of sharing the personal income tax (PIT) among the three tiers 
of government was introduced, which improved the predictability of the 
intergovernmental finance. A system of equalization grants was introduced, thus 
reducing central government’s discretion in earmarking sums for LGs.  
There are still shortcomings left, however, some of which became apparent only 
subsequently in practice. The rate of the shared taxes has been altered each year 
through ASBLs, though lately it has stabilized around the values specified in the 
LLPF. Special funds dedicated to investments continued to exist, and they are 
allocated to LGs in a way that is neither transparent nor very accountable. Some 
matching grants for investments are included in the state budget with a known 
destination. But some of them are simply given to the relevant line ministries, who are 
responsible for administering them (most often Public Works or Industries, since the 
typical investments are in roads, social housing, water systems, and gas pipes).  
Another problem is the substantial interaction taking place, through both formal and 
informal channels, between county and locality officials in the process of drafting the 
budgets and allocating the transfer funds. As counties have to wait for the passing of 
the ASBL in order to see how much money they will eventually get, so the localities 
have to wait in turn for the county councils to finalize the equalization process. This 
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process creates many points of entry for political lobbying and the rent-seeking 
behavior. 
 
4. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
In the last decade we have witnessed a steady process of reassignment of both 
functions and revenues to sub-national levels of government in Romania. The 
language of the LLPA drafted in 1991 was loose enough so as to accommodate 
without problems the subsequent reassignments. As a result, until 1997-98 a slow 
process of decentralization by ‘creeping’ took place. Two kinds of motivations at the 
central level may explain this process: 
• Successive governments faced mounting external pressure to implement reforms 
packages, whether from the international financial institutions, bilateral aid 
agencies of the European Union. Decentralization has a crucial component in all 
these packages.  
• The central government wanted to get rid of some spending and administrative 
burdens, and hence transferred responsibilities to the lower levels. 
On the other hand, there were constraints that sometimes made the decentralization 
process look half-hearted, such as: 
• The genuine concerns in central government regarding LGs’ poor managerial 
capability, possibilities of fraud or municipal bankruptcy, overall public debt, 
rising inequality, etc. 
• The well-entrenched paternalistic attitude towards LGs, who are not regarded as 
equals of the government by top officials and the public, no matter what the law 
says.  
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Nevertheless, the decentralization continued and actually gained speed on both 
dimensions − attributions and revenues − after the big push initiated in 1998 and 
continued in 2001. Fig.2.2 displays the evolution in time of the size of local 
governments expenditure. While the trend may be judged as positive, we should also 
bear in mind the warning of Vito Tanzi (2001): in modern and democratic societies, 
decentralization in spending correlates with a larger public sector. In other words, 
some European countries may be more decentralized just because they have more 
state and less private sector in their societies. Many times when assets or services are 
privatized, these are more likely to come from the portfolio of local governments. 
Which is to say that privatization may be an even better alternative than 
decentralization.  
 
4.1. Functions of local governments 
Central authorities have a tendency of maintaining control over the level of 
expenditures in LGs from macroeconomic reasons on the one hand, and because they 
are partially funded form the state budget on the other hand. Local autonomy is 
strongly restricted when central authorities micro-manage expenditures at the local 
level. In fact, in this situation, local authorities are only used as agents in executing 
national policies (such as education) or play the part of revenue distributors (up to an 
amount set at the central level) to public services that, by their nature, need to be 
provided at the local level (utilities). At the other extreme, in case of strong local 
autonomy, the central authority only plays the part of control in the consolidated level 
of local governments, leaving them the whole decision-making power on the amount 
of expenditures and their allocation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.3. LG expenditure, USD
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The ex-communist countries, Romania included, are somewhere in-between these two 
extreme cases. Their place on the continuum is defined by the combination of own 
and mandated functions imposed on them by the central government. The analysis 
below distinguishes between mandatory and optional tasks of LGs, taking into 
account they way a particular service is financed, provided and regulated, as well as 
the degree of limitation of local decision-making power each of them implies. Fig.2.3 
gives an idea of the functional structure of expenditures at the local level in 2002, 
which is the most expanded the Romanian LGs have seen so far.  
Several observations can be made about the attributions of LGs in Romania, in 
connection with their degree of autonomy. First, the scope and size of services 
increased steadily over time, as the central government transferred additional 
functions to lower levels. Currently The most important mandates, both in terms of 
visibility and share in the local budgets, are the ones that were transferred (or 
redefined) more recently: education and welfare support. Second, some mandates 
were terminated, such as the obligation to subsidize the local public transportation. 
And third, many substantial attributions are currently in process of being 
decentralized, such as police, emergency services or the specialized health sector. All 
these generate important effects for the equalization  system. The new functions and 
mandates will probably reinforce the current trend of increasing the share of LG 
expenditure in the total public expenditure through earmarked sums allocated by the 
central government, both by functional destination and geographical area. In practical 
terms, this will reduce both the share of own revenues in LGs’ budgets and their 
autonomy to make spending decisions.  
On the other hand, the government argues that the decentralization agenda will not be 
expanded forever, and this will be the last wave of substantial reassignments of 
functions. When these are completed, in one or two years, the situation will stabilize 
and we shall have a clearer picture of the costs of each service − and of the true 
vertical and horizontal imbalance in the Romanian intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
Then, the central government committed themselves to relax some of the mandates 
now imposed on the local governments, and transform some of the dedicated transfers 
associated with them into own revenues, or at least general purpose tax shares. Until 
then, the pure quantitative analysis of trends in both expenditures and revenues is a bit 
misleading if it is not supplemented with an institutional assessment, as well as a 
description of the general direction of evolution.  
Nevertheless, the overall impression one gains from the unfolding of the 
decentralization of functions in Romania is that a uniform template was used so that 
the attributions do not differ by region or type of local unit. The central government 
was in charge and the whole process is very much centrally driven. The principle of 
correspondence was followed most of the time in decentralizing the functions. 
However, there are marginal variations from this principle which could be attributed 
to ‘subsidiarity by default’: for example, when service provision is maintained at sub-
optimal levels, either because of sheer institutional inertia or local opposition to the 
transfer of the service to the next upper level. A good case in point is education in 
small rural communities, provided in school that continue to function with very few 
pupils.  
 
4.2. Revenues of local governments 
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According to the OECD classification (OECD, 1999), the fiscal discretion in local 
government should be judged with two criteria: freedom to determine the taxable base 
and the tax rate. Starting from a situation of complete local autonomy, when the LG 
can determine both the rate and the base of a tax, the freedom of movement is reduced 
in subnational units as the central government can intervene and set the base or the 
rate of a local tax − or both. In addition, various tax-sharing arrangements may range 
from those controlled by the LGs to those completely controlled by the central 
government. Judged on these terms, the situation of the Romanian LG own revenues 
is the following: 
i) Own revenues proper, the most important of which are the local taxes and fees 
regulated by the LLT: 
• Since 1997-98 until Jan 2003: there was some discretion in setting the tax rate, 
within a range specified by the law for the local property taxes (land, buildings, 
vehicles) and other user fees (licenses, permits, etc); all qualify for (b), but just 
• After Jan 2003, when the new LLT will be enacted: all of the above are governed 
by the new Local Taxes Law, which narrows the range of local options for the 
property tax rate − so everything moves to (e) 
• The special purpose taxes, that can be introduced by LGs at their own will, and 
other own revenues that are not affected by the new LLT remain in the category 
(a) 
ii) Personal Income Tax shares (considered to be own revenues for the purpose of 
municipal borrowing, for example), qualify for the category (d4): both the base and 
the rate are set by the central government, but the revenue is split automatically, on a 
monthly basis, according to a formula specified in the LLPF that can be modified by 
the Annual Budget (Tab 2.1). The PIT shares serve both for horizontal and vertical 
equalization, as it is shown in the next section. 
iii) VAT share grants, allocated yearly through the Annual State budget. They were 
introduced for the first time in 2001, the amount of the transfers is set discretionary by 
the central government and the money is earmarked.  
iv) Other transfers and subsidies from special funds, also defined in the ASBL. 
 
Tab 2.1. The PIT shares assigned to LGs by LLPF and the Annual Budget Laws 
 LLPF 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Municipalities 40% 35% 35% 36.5% 36.5% 36% 
Counties, own 10% 15% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Counties, for equalization   15% 15% 16% 17% 
 
The evolution in time of the proportion of each type of revenue is shown in Fig.2.4. 
LGs are allowed to introduce new local taxes (and then the revenue is usually 
earmarked for a specific purpose) for which they will determine freely the taxable 
base and the rate. Many have done so, but their total contribution to the budgets is 
hard to evaluate since they are not usually shown separately in the aggregated reports. 
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The percentage is likely to be small, though it may make a difference for the provision 
of that particular service.  
Though in theory the government encourages LGs to become more self-reliant, this 
doesn’t always happen in practice. There were instances when county prefects sued 
local councils in administrative courts when they try to introduce new local taxes (it 
happened in Bucharest in 2000). Some ministers reprimanded several times local 
councils that levied “unreasonable taxes on the already-impoverished population” (on 
pets, garbage collection, vehicles pulled by animals, park entrance fees, etc). The 
media, more often than not, is also ready to pour scorn on any such local initiative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, as mentioned above, the same government removed recently from 
the new Local Taxes Law the possibility of the LGs to go the other way and lower the 
taxes − the minister argued that, because of “populist reasons”, irresponsible mayors 
were threatening the local own revenues base. The examples given were several large 
cities, but no hard data were produced to back the allegations. Moreover, there seems 
to be indeed a race to the bottom taking place in small towns or rural municipalities: 
the mayors underestimate their own revenues in the draft budgets in order to get more 
equalization funds. This is a typical case of substitution effect induced by the 
equalization system, was confirmed by local CFOs and it becomes apparent when one 
analyzes the difference between the projected budgets and the execution one year 
later: the projected own revenues have systematically been lower that what was 
actually collected realized.  
The mayors and CFOs do not seem to be affected very much by the newly introduced 
limitations (the shift from b to e tax categories). They estimate that the new law, 
because of the zoning policy and other provisions, will increase their revenues by at 
least 20-25%.  
Fig. 2.4. LG revenues, USD
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5. The Equalization System 
The equalization system is an important component of the intergovernmental fiscal 
relations, in both federal and unitary states. Even loose confederations like the 
European Union have set up systems to transfer funds between their components units 
− national states − in order to compensate for disparities in the level of development 
(structural funds) or cross-unit externalities (environmental or agricultural subsidies). 
In theory, LGs may provide public goods that not only benefit their own residents, but 
residents of other localities as well. Because of these externalities, the central 
government is assumed to set up programs of intergovernmental transfers that 
function as Pigovian corrective subsidies (Wildasin, 1997). If we consider, by 
stretching a bit the meaning of the concept, that a certain amount of equality among 
regions and localities is also a public good, than the moral ground for the fiscal 
equalization is established: by redistributing a portion of the local income, the 
government maximizes the general welfare of the society.  
However, the basic premise of the theory is that public-sector decision-making 
proceeds sequentially, in two steps. First, the central government’s program of 
corrective intervention sets normative budgetary limitations for localities. Then, in 
turn, LGs choose their level of local taxes and expenditures according to the local 
autonomy principles. But the circle does not close here. After observing the local 
fiscal decisions, higher-level authorities can intervene in the third step with extra 
subsidies or bailouts, transparent or hidden under various disguises, in those places 
where resources do not match the “needs”. Knowing this, the LGs can anticipate the 
moves of the central government and act in such a way so that they become net 
receivers of financial help − either by overspending or by not exploiting fully the local 
revenue generating power. This is a typical moral hazard situation, and all those who 
design equalization systems try to build safeguards against it.  
Nevertheless, no matter how carefully these safeguards are projected, the basic fact 
remains that the equalization grants are subsidies for poor LGs − and like in the case 
any other good, poverty is something the more you pay for, the more of it you will 
get. In time the agents in cause will adjust their behavior creatively to the subsidy 
system rules, and the claims against the equalization system will multiply. In order to 
minimize these perverse effects, the analysis and recommendations below concerning 
the equalization system in Romania start from a few simple principles: 
• The simpler, the better. Transparency discourages rent-seeking and makes rule-
bending more difficult. 
• Enforcing hard budget constraints (Kornai, 1986) is a prerequisite for any 
sustainable intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. The local budgets should be 
“hard” in the sense that the third step of intergovernmental policy mentioned above 
does not occur − or is exceptional enough so that it does not represent an easy exit 
for local officials. Moral hazard should thus be prevented, whether it is related to 
municipal borrowing proper, or overspending and accumulation of arrears. 
• Whenever a change in rules needs to be made, it should lead to as little fiscal 
shocks as possible on the short run. In other words, new rules may be introduced as 
long as they determine a gradual departure from the status quo. Otherwise, it is 
unlikely that the fiscal reforms will be accepted by the majority of the stakeholders 
(Molle, 1997).  
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5.1. Sources of funds 
There are two main sources of funds used for horizontal and vertical equalization in 
Romania: the Personal Income Tax (PIT) and Value Added Tax (VAT). Until 1999 
the first was actually a simple salary tax and the central government used to allocate 
discretionary amounts to local governments through the Annual Budget Law from the 
total yield of the tax. It was only the LLPF that introduced in 1998 the notion of 
sharing the PIT revenues according to predefined quotas among the three tiers of 
government. The sums are collected by stoppage at origin (the location of the 
workplace) and transferred to localities, counties and the state budget on a monthly 
basis. Therefore the system works more or less automatically and is fairly predictable 
− which sometimes make people argue that the PIT shares can be assimilated to LG 
own revenues. However, the local governments cannot control the base, the rate or the 
collection system, and hence this is actually a typical shared tax. The total of sums 
allocated as shared PIT has increased in time from 50% of the total yield indicated in 
the text of the LLPF to 62.5% in 2002 (see Tab 2.1)4, which reflects a higher degree 
of financial autonomy at the local level.  
Of the PIT shares they receive, the counties must allocate some funds for the purpose 
of horizontal equalization. This amount was not defined as a specific share at the 
beginning, and hence the counties have tended to abuse the system by confiscating 
most of the funds. Starting with 2000 the State Budget Laws have split the county 
shares into two parts: own, and earmarked for equalization (Tab 2.1).  
The rest of the PIT revenues (37.5% in 2002) goes to the state budget − but part of it 
returns to LGs as conditional grants attached to some mandates (hence serving the 
purpose of vertical equalization) or block grants for horizontal equalization. 
Eventually, the state budget is left with little more than 10% of the total PIT revenues. 
The actual split of PIT revenues by destination in the 2002 budget is detailed in 
Fig.2.5.  
(Fig.2.5 and 2.6 about here, 2 pg. landscape – see at the end) 
 
 As mentioned before, the PIT sharing system combines the horizontal and vertical 
equalization. Moreover, the conditionality and destination of sums should be analyzed 
in connection with the assignment of functions discussed in the previous section. 
Certain aspects that influence the process of fiscal equalization should be outlined 
here. First, the PIT revenues transferred to LGs are split into two main categories:  
• PIT shares (‘cote’), defined according to the percentages specified in LLPF and 
Annual State Budget Laws (box S in Fig.2.5). Even though the ASBL can alter 
these percentages, they tended to remain stable in time, with a slight upward 
tendency that benefits LGs (Tab 2.1). Part of the shares that go to counties is 
earmarked for horizontal equalization (box 8). The percentages that define the PIT 
sharing are fixed for one budgetary cycle (and fairly stable since they have been 
first introduced) and apply to all local government units. No county or locality is 
allowed to change the rates or apply surcharges.  
                                                
4 The LLPF was passed in 1998 and the article that specifies the shares was meant to serve just as 
guidance – an ideal target to be met in time – since the actual shares can be modified by Annual Budget 
Law. In the first year when the new system was implemented, 1999, the actual percentages were indeed 
lower than those provided by in LLPF (Tab 2.1). 
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• PIT ‘amounts’ (‘sume’), defined discretionary by the central government in the 
Annual State budget Law (box A in Fig.2.5). There is no legal requirement as to 
how large this pool of funds taken from the central government’s share of PIT 
should be. However, it has always revolved around 25% of the total collection.  
Fig.2.7 represents in simplified form the flow of funds for equalization, with their two 
main components, E and S, and the two-step transfer for the component E.  
 
Fig. 2.7. The basic design of the equalization system in Romania  
(E = boxes 3 and 4; S = box 8 in Fig.2.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The PIT ‘amounts’ (box A) serve both for vertical and horizontal equalization: 
• Welfare support, introduced for the first time by the 2002 budget (box 1): general 
welfare support distributed by LGs and based on means testing; residential heating 
supplementary subsidy (heating vouchers), also based on means testing 
• General price subsidy paid to the utilities through the local budgets (box 5) 
• Horizontal equalization grant allocated to counties; they can withhold up to 25% 
of it for their own use (box 3), and distribute the rest to localities from their 
jurisdiction (box 4). 
The grants depicted in boxes no.1, 2, 4, 5 and 8 (Fig.2.5) are those where County 
Councils can intervene in their allocation by localities, because the money is 
transferred first to them and they distribute it further. The language of the law is not 
clear − typically it refers to ‘consultations’ among county councils, mayors and the 
relevant deconcentrated ministry offices. The issue is important especially for the 
process of horizontal equalization (boxes 3, 4 and 8) and creates problems in the 
allocation of funds. We will come back to this in the next section. 
The second source of funds for equalization is the VAT yield. Since VAT is a purely 
national tax, the central government allocates conditional grants in relation with a set 
of attributions that were transferred to LGs starting with 2000. The sums by 
destinations and counties are specified in the annex to the State Budget Law.  The 
total pool of money to be transferred is not defined in any law, since VAT sharing 
was only introduced in 2001 and the need for flexibility prevailed at a time when 
major reassignments of functions are still under way. Nevertheless, the total VAT 
share transferred to LGs did not vary too much in the two years when it was used: 
Central government 
Counties 
Localities
E 
S
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about 31% of the revenues collected in 2001 and 33% in 2002. The actual split of 
VAT revenues by destination in the 2002 budget is displayed in Fig.2.7.  
The counties get the sums from the state budget, following the list annexed to the 
State Budget Law. In turn, the counties transfer the funds further to localities, where 
applicable (boxes 2, 3, 4 and 6), according to the local needs that were originally 
incorporated into the draft local budgets. There is still not much experience with this 
process, and no firm criteria to be followed. As a result, the process is not very 
transparent yet. In practice, the county councils decide how much to give and to 
whom following the need estimates that fundamented the local draft budgets sent to 
the MoF in the first stage of the budgetary cycle. If the MoF allocated less money 
than the LGs requested at the aggregate level, then the shares of each locality are 
reduced proportionately. The whole process is based on consultations among county 
council presidents and mayors, with expert advice from the part of the county offices 
of the relevant ministries (Finance, Education, Welfare, etc.).  
 
5.2. Vertical equalization 
Vertical disparities in Romania have fluctuated widely in the last decade. In the early 
’90s, when the LGs were still not consolidated and lacked a reliable base of own 
revenues, most of the spending was controlled and financed from the center. As a 
consequence the disparities were high and many functions were matched by 
conditional transfers. By the mid-nineties, after the adoption of the Law of Local 
Taxes, the LGs were able to secure their own basis of revenues − the most important 
of which has been the property tax − and their fiscal independence increased. In 1996-
98 the proportion of own revenues in total expenditure increased slowly to 25-30%5.  
The situation improved even more in 1999 and 2000, with the introduction of the PIT 
sharing system: if we include the automatic shares of the PIT allocated to LGs, the 
rate of coverage surpassed 50%. In these two years the total transfers from the state 
budget aimed at financing mandated functions were roughly one third of the LGs 
expenditure (the rest includes various subsidies and funds earmarked for non-
mandated functions).  
But the substantial reassignment of functions that begun in 2001 reversed the trend. 
Section 4.1. in this chapter explains why this happened: many new functions that were 
transferred to LGs created in fact mandates for the sub-national government (Tab 2.2). 
The typical cases are salaries in education and the national welfare policy, in which 
the central government maintains many points of intervention. In parallel with the 
task to execute these mandates, earmarked grants were created − supplementary PIT 
‘amounts’ and VAT shares − to finance their provision. As a result, the total LG 
expenditure increased by almost 40% in absolute volume, the share of own revenues 
declined proportionately and the portion of transfers aimed at making up for vertical 
imbalances surged.  
 
 
                                                
5 However, the real ($) values for 1999 are the least reliable due to a surge in the inflation rate that 
occurred in the spring of that year and which reduces the significance of the yearly average exchange 
rate.  
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Tab 2.2. Categories of expenditure in the LG budgets 
  Before 
2000 
2001-2002 
Not mandated General local services 40% 25% 
 Public transportation 20% 8-9% 
Mandated Education 10-12% 35% 
 Welfare policy 5-6% 15% 
 
This long term trend is reflected in the evolution of the Hunter coefficient − the ratio 
of own revenues to total revenues in LGs − over the last years (Fig.2.8). Since 1998, 
when the sharing of PIT was inaugurated and the shares proper have become quasi-
own revenues (boxes 6 and 7 in Fig.2.5), the Hunter coefficient can be calculated in 
two ways:  
• conservatively, by taking into account the own revenues only (the solid line); 
• more broadly, by including among own revenues the PIT shares (the dotted line) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In both cases, the value is slightly higher if we separate the two tiers of local 
government and refer to the first one only (localities). In other words, localities have a 
little more control over their own revenues than counties do. However, the numbers 
may underestimate the important role the counties play in allocating the equalization 
amounts (box 8 in Fig.2.5), especially since they can decide how much of these funds 
they can withhold.  
Fig. 2.8. Vertical imbalance: the Hunter coefficient 
(own revenues of LGs/total)
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 For both counties and localities, the trend is clear: the proportion of sums spent for 
covering the cost of mandates has risen, at the expense of the non-mandated 
functions. The situation is unlikely to change much in the near future. The 
government has set an  ambitious agenda for the next one or two years − more 
attributions will be reassigned to LGs. The list includes police, disaster relief, 
emergency services, local power plants. The exact impact on the local budgets is hard 
to estimate, but the direction of change will be the same: more mandatory spending, 
and probably more dedicated transfers paid from the VAT revenues collected at the 
national level.  
In the long run, the government will be probably able to transform some of the 
earmarked sums and subsidies into own sources of revenue (or at least general 
purpose transfers with stable allocation formulas, such as shared taxes) and the local 
budgetary process will become more stable. Until then, the attempts to do fine-tuning 
in revenue allocation are probably useless, and the attention should focus on the few 
big issues that can make a difference irrespective of how the final assignment of 
functions look like.  
The process of transfer is complex and unpredictable and sometimes even the central 
government cannot control it fully. For example, some services that will be 
transferred to LGs must be first demilitarized (police, firefighters). This is a sensitive 
and visible issue. Most probably, it will be fiercely opposed by the stakeholders 
involved, who will not like to see their special military status abolished and become 
local civil servants instead of employees of a central ministry. This creates uncertainty 
and political risks until the reassignment is completed. Moreover, it is difficult to 
make an estimate of the real costs of these services as long as they are part on central 
ministries, because many auxiliary operations and overheads are shared with other 
departments. The only realistic option in this respect is learning by doing − and hence 
the central government has one more reason to continue for some time to use 
earmarked sums and preserve its rooms of maneuver.  
 
5. 3. Horizontal equalization 
The capacity of LGs to raise their own revenues varies substantially from one unit to 
the other. For example, the county revenues per inhabitant in the 2001 budgetary 
cycle range more than 1:3 from the poorest to the most well-off county (Tab 2.3). The 
range of variation is larger than that of the PIB per capita or any other measure of 
development, because it reflects not only the absolute level of poverty in a particular 
area, but also the incapacity of the government, central or local, to develop a tax base 
and collect revenues in that constituency. The value of property varies more than the 
average salary from one region to the other; moreover, the informal economic sector 
is much larger in some areas that in others − for example in predominantly rural 
regions with strip farming and household consumption of the production. Without 
valuable property to tax and official jobs that generate PIT in the constituency, the 
local governments cannot realize own revenues. If anything, the disparities are even 
more pronounced within than among counties. The power to generate own revenues 
in the lower tier of local government, the localities, varies from 1 to 600 (Tab 2.3).  
The formula of PIT sharing introduced in 1999 is simple and straightforward (Tab 
2.1), but it has a downside: it functions as a generator of horizontal imbalances, 
especially at the lowest level of LGs. Since the tax is collected at the point of origin 
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and then split among national, county and locality budgets, it benefits those 
municipalities (usually large cities or towns) which have many official jobs on their 
territory. When residents of rural settlements commute to work in the nearby town, 
the latter collects all the corresponding share of the PIT. Thus, the differences in 
revenue raising capacity are magnified, both at the local and county levels. Richer 
counties also benefit, because at the same level of personal income you are more 
likely to have a formal job here than in a poor county, where a larger part of the real 
income tends to remain hidden.  
 
Tab 2.3. Variations in resources per capita in LGs: own revenues plus PIT 
shares, 2001  
 
$/cap Counties Localities 
Average 8.6 33 
Max  25.6 705 
Min 2.9 1.2 
Standard deviation / average 0.48 0.9 
 
Therefore, the need arises to mitigate the effects of these discrepancies. There are 
many reasons to do this: it would be politically unacceptable to decrease the provision 
level under a certain threshold even in the poorest communities. Even if, strictly 
speaking, not all the local government functions are national mandates, certain 
general government and local services have to be offered to every citizen. Moreover, 
in the ex-communist states almost all local communities have inherited a network of 
local services, more or less extended, and a strong expectation that they will continue 
to function. Terminating this tacit social contract is difficult even in the direst 
financial situations. Many local governments are now confronted with the issue of 
over-extended services and shrinking finances − especially small towns, where the 
urban services cannot benefit from economies of scale.  
Before the adoption of the Law of Local Public Finance in 1998, it was hard to 
distinguish in Romania between the vertical and horizontal equalization. Both kinds 
of imbalances were addressed through the distribution of conditional transfers. The 
criteria for the distribution were numerous and kept changing from one year to the 
other, while vertical negotiations at all levels were playing an important role. The 
basic idea was to develop a comprehensive set of normative criteria that could 
approximate as closely as possible ‘the real need of the community’. Many things 
were factored in at one moment or another − such as the area, number of inhabitants, 
length of roads, size of the running water and sewerage systems, number of children 
in school, hospital beds, persons assisted in special institutions, but they were not 
specified in a text of law. The problem with this system was that the rules were 
cumbersome, negotiable and thus unpredictable. They created perverse incentives: the 
LGs had strong motives to oppose any kind of reform or rationalization in the social 
services, since the transfers were not linked with performance, but with the physical 
extension of the service.  
Horizontal equalization was not so much a goal as such, but rather a by-product of the 
distribution based on normatives. Moreover, the pattern of allocation ran against it: 
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the richer and better endowed with local services a local community was, the more 
money was likely to receive. Corrections were applied to this distribution, but in a 
non-systematic manner.  
The decentralization reform package initiated in 1998 separated the objectives and 
instruments for vertical and horizontal equalization. It also introduced the notion of 
fiscal capacity as a benchmark to be used in the process of equalization across LGs. 
At the beginning, the fiscal capacity was weighted only 30% in the process of 
equalization. The rest of 70% depended on a combination of normatives used as a 
proxy for the community ‘need’. Gradually all the other criteria were removed one by 
one, so that in 2002 the fiscal capacity represents the only element used for horizontal 
equalization. 
The gradual removal of needs as a factor in horizontal equalization, shown in Tab 2.4, 
is the result of a long debate that could not be settled in 1998. The ‘fast reformers’ 
(Ministry of Local Administration, foreign advisers) tended to favor a simpler 
solution based predominantly on the fiscal capacity principle. They also argued for 
the inclusion in the text of the precise notion of ‘equalization formula’. On the other 
hand, the ‘conservatives’ (Ministry of Finance) wanted to preserve their room of 
maneuver by continuing with the looser concept of ‘equalization criteria’. Even 
though the latter prevailed at first, the formula-based equalization gained ground and 
eventually won. Currently a formula is included in the ASBL that uses the collection 
of PIT in each local government area − a variable beyond the control of LGs − as a 
proxy for local fiscal capacity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tab 2.4. Criteria for horizontal equalization, in time 
 Need Fiscal 
capacity 
1999 Population, length of streets, no. houses, water 
and sewerage network, children in school, 
children in orphanages, disabled persons   
 
70% 
 
30% 
2000 Population, length of streets, no. houses, water 
and sewerage network, children in school, 
children in orphanages 
 
70% 
 
30% 
2001 Area of LG, children in school, children in 
orphanages, disabled persons 
30% 70% 
2002   100% 
The fiscal capacity formula 
 
       (ORC/PC)/(ORL/PL) x PL/PC 
EL =         x EC 
Σ ((ORC/PC)/(ORL/PL) x PL/PC)  
  L=1 
 
EL    = equalization grant per locality 
EC    = equalization grant per county 
ORL  = own revenues (including PIT shares) per capita − locality 
ORC  = own revenues (including PIT shares) per capita − county 
PL       = population of locality 
PC       = population of county 
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The system of horizontal equalization works in two steps: 
• First the MoF allocates by county the total pool of funds defined as PIT ‘amounts’ 
(box A in Fig.2.5, corresponding to the 2002 budget). The fiscal capacity formula 
is then applied and the resulted distribution of funds is published as an annex to 
the State budget Law.  
• In the second step, the counties withhold their share of the equalization funds (up 
to 25% of the sum received) and distribute the rest to localities. This stage of 
equalization is much more problematic, since not all the counties use the fiscal 
equalization formula. Actually, few of them do so − and only as a base for starting 
negotiations with the mayors of localities. Most counties interpret the provisions 
in the ASBL as mere ‘guidelines’ and argue that following strictly the formula’s 
results is not workable in practice. MoF has been unable so far to enforce a 
uniform and transparent equalization mechanism at the sub-county level.  
By design, the fiscal capacity formula aims at compensating the counties and 
localities for both the relative poverty of a region and the adverse effect of the PIT 
shares stopped at origin. The departures from this policy goal at the county level are 
only marginal, and due to the differences occurring between the budget projection and 
execution. 
The problem is, the inclusion of own revenues as a fiscal capacity indicator creates 
disincentives to maximize them at the LG level − the typical substitution effect of 
own revenues with equalization money. The phenomenon was not apparent in the first 
years of application of the new mechanism, but as people become more accustomed to 
it, especially in rural communes, the practice is spreading fast. Since the data 
introduced in the fiscal capacity formula are the projected own revenues for the 
following year, the LGs can underestimate them in order to get more equalization 
funds at the expense of their neighbors. In time, this triggers a ‘race to the bottom’ 
among the localities in the same county that only skews the pattern of distribution, 
while the total pool of funds stays the same. A quick solution is needed here in order 
to remove the vicious incentives from the system. 
Apart from the above, counties get additional equalization funds on a monthly basis, 
as a direct share of the PIT yield (box 8 in Fig.2.5, defined as 15% of the PIT in 2001 
and 16% in 2002). They distribute this money to “communes, towns, cities, and their 
own budget, after getting expert advice from the territorial MoF offices”. This second 
pool of money is more reliable and predictable than the first, since it depends on the 
level of PIT collection, not on the central government’s wishes. However, the 
legislator ignored a small detail: to impose a cap on the share that can be withheld by 
the counties. As a result, predictability only applies to counties; the localities are 
completely at the mercy of the county councils and presidents, who in some cases 
have decided to give nothing to localities. Fig.2.9 below reproduces the basic logic of 
the equalization system in Romania displeyed in Fig.2.7 and shows the most 
important sources of problems in the process of fiscal equalization − in the form of 
loopholes or ‘points of entry’ for discretionary decisions.  
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Fig. 2.9. Main sources of problems in the Romanian equalization system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2.10 below illustrates the wide range of variation in allocating the second PIT 
share (S) by localities − i.e. the effects of the loopholes described in boxes (c) and (d) 
on Fig.2.9. The discretion exerted by counties is total: in some cases the localities are 
given next to nothing (ex. Vrancea county); in others, large cities get a 
disproportionate share. Rural communes, who are generally most in need, are the 
most likely to suffer from this erratic distribution. What is more, there is no obvious 
correlation between the general poverty of counties and a specific pattern of 
allocation. Which suggest that it is entirely up to the county councils to decide how to 
distribute.  
The current practices governing the relations between counties and localities generate 
problems for both tiers of local government. Lacking appropriate instruments to 
pursue their legitimate goals − investments with inter-locality spillover or economies 
of scale effects, regional development, etc − the counties resort to informal pressures, 
conditioning of investments allocations, or distorting the equalization mechamisms. 
The sums are sometimes used to reward political associates, and sometimes as a lever 
to force localities into thinking broadly and cooperate more with each other. The first 
goal is illegitimate, the second is legitimate − but in both cases the instrument for 
pursuing it should not be the equalization grants system.  
Rural communes are the most affected by these interventions, since in most cases 
their financial autonomy is weaker. But all the localities suffer, more or less. 
Professional multi-annual budgeting becomes impossible when they cannot estimate 
in advance the size of the equalization grants. Ideally the grants should only depend 
on the overall size of the equalization pool in one year. The allocation formula is only 
meant to provide a ranking of localities according to their fiscal capacity. If the 
evaluation is correct, there will be relatively little changes in this ranking from one 
year to the other, and so the local officials will know in advance with a high degree of 
probability where they stand and what will be the level of resources they can rely on. 
Their incentives will thus be to focus not on permanent lobbying for larger sums, but 
on prioritizing the spending items.  
More specifically, several systemic flaws can be identified as far as the equalization 
grants rules are concerned.  
Central government
Counties 
Localities
E
S
a. Total pool 
not defined 
b. Formula 
applied 
inconsistently 
c. Pool defined, but 
no cap on the 
share withheld by 
counties 
d. Formula applied 
inconsistently 
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Fig. 2.10. The way counties have distributed the PIT share for 
equalization, 2000 -- 15%  (box 8 in Fig. 5)
- the absolute sums also show the relative wealth of counties -
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Unfairness. The equalization funds are distributed more or less randomly, both at the 
locality and county level, as Fig.2.11a-c show. Though in theory these sums should 
compensate LGs with low capacity to generate own revenues, and hence there should 
be a clear inverse correlation between fiscal power and grants funds, the legal 
loopholes allow counties to intervene and bend the rules. First, since there is no limit 
on the portion of the 16% PIT share the counties can withhold for their own budget 
(box 8 in Fig.2.5), a wide variation appears in the pattern of distributing these funds 
(Fig.2.10). Some counties take much more than others, at the expense of the localities 
in their geographical area − and thus shift funds from the horizontal to the vertical 
equalization component. The process is not controlled or coordinated, and hence the 
distribution resulted has nothing to do with equalization: in Fig.2.11a-c there is no 
relationship between the fiscal power of counties and the per-capita sums received / or 
withheld / as equalization funds. This creates a serious problem for rural communes, 
left at the mercy of cash-hungry counties.  
Second, the counties do not follow the fiscal capacity formula when distributing 
equalization funds at the sub-county level. Though the reason usually put forward by 
county officials is that the formula is too rigid and does not provide enough resources 
too the poorest localities, Fig.2.11 shows that the current “flexible” practices do not 
actually improve fairness. The 2,951 Romanian localities are plotted on the charts 
according to the level of own revenues (proper + PIT share) and the equalization 
funds per capita they receive. There is very little correlation between the ‘need’ of 
localities and what they actually get from the equalization system. The counties’ 
discretion in defining the total pool of equalization funds going to localities, and the 
rules of allocation by locality, create the combined effect displayed in Fig.2.11a and 
b: cities and towns get funds almost randomly; while in the rural communities several 
dozens of them get disproportionately large funds, while many poor LGs do not have 
money either from own sources or transfers. 
These findings are not surprising, nor are they specific to the case of Romania. It has 
been noted before that there is a systematic asymmetry in the way hard budget 
constraints are enforced in intergovernmental fiscal relations: larger LGs tend to face 
“softer” constraints (Wildasin, 1997). This tendency is manifest both at the level of 
localities and regions. Cities (especially county capitals) often get more than their fair 
share of the equalization funds (Fig.2.10), sometimes as a result of overspending in 
the previous years. Counties definitely face softer budgetary constraints, as it was 
explained above, since they can interfere in the equalization process and adjust at will 
the portion withheld for their own budget. A good system should counteract this trend 
that puts smaller and poorer LGs at disadvantage.  
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Fig. 2.11a. County revenues, 2001, $/cap
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Fig. 2.11c. Localities' revenues: rural, 2001, $/cap
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Fig. 2.11b. Localities' revenues: urban, 2001, $/cap
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Lack of clarity of purpose. This refers to many things: policy objectives of the 
equalization system; procedures for aggregating financial data; the allocation of 
investment funds. In theory, LLPF and ASBL define, indirectly, two streams of funds 
that are meant to (1) alleviate disparities among the three tiers of government (central, 
county, local), and (2) perform some redistribution among local government units 
within the same tier of administration. In the words used above, the first objective is 
vertical equalization; the second is horizontal equalization. In practice, the 
discretionary power of each county in defining how much of the PIT equalization 
share (box 8 in Fig.2.5) goes actually to horizontal equalization, and how much is 
kept in the county budget, muddles the process on both components. The total pools 
for vertical and horizontal equalization thus become uncontrolled and unpredictable. 
Together with the inconsistent use of equalization formula mentioned before, this 
generates an uncertain environment for localities, especially small rural ones, which 
makes long-term budgetary planning difficult.  
The current reporting procedures of financial data is also a problem, because they are 
not designed so as to allow modern public management in the LGs, and policy 
analysis at the macro level. A lot of relevant information is lost in the process of 
aggregating data as they are passed up from LGs to the Ministry of Finance. The 
accounting system is still cash-based, so that many assets, liabilities and debts are not 
recorded. There is additional pressure on them not to do so, since the law does not 
allow LGs to close the budgetary cycle with deficits. More generally, there is no 
tradition in the Romanian public sector to analyze and report financial data to external 
users (banks, firms, independent analysts, ultimately the citizens) in the appropriate 
format and with due diligence. This lack of transparency in the use of funds, even 
when there is no need to cover something up, turns eventually against the institutions: 
for example, it would be easier for localities to demonstrate that they are abused by 
counties if they analyzed and presented the situation of equalization funds like in 
Fig.2.11. 
The way in which LGs and the MoF classify revenues can also hide useful 
information and skew the redistribution rules: the “Other” category is too large and 
unspecified, and it may be that both localities and counties divert funds towards it 
from “Own revenues” line in order to get more equalization funds. The special 
transfers − price subsidies for heating, special funds for roads, housing, etc − also 
contains money that are unevenly and opaquely distributed, functioning in fact as a 
counter-equalizer (Polishchuk, 2001).  
 
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
In spite of the shortcomings mentioned in the previous section, the current 
equalization grants system introduced in 1998-99 represents an improvement when 
compared with the situation that existed before. The notions of vertical and horizontal 
equalization were operationalized separately and it is now possible to estimate how 
much financial effort goes into each of them, and to follow trends in time. A simple 
and clear allocation formula was eventually reached which is applied consistently in 
the first step of the equalization process: the distribution of funds from the central 
government, by county. Even if the formula is not consistently applied in the second 
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step − from counties to localities − it remains a benchmark against which the process 
of horizontal equalization can be assessed. 
In this context, it is now possible to outline an agenda for improvement. It must fix 
the flaws in the system that have become apparent so far − but on the other hand take 
into account the need for flexibility and uncertainties that will continue for a while. 
The reassignment of functions to LGs is not yet completed and substantial transfers 
are on the agenda for the next one or two years. The calendar − or indeed costs − of 
these new transfers of functions are difficult to foresee. Therefore, any attempt to 
fine-tune and write in stone the intergovernmental fiscal rules are premature. It is 
likely that any new major reallocation of attributions by the central government will 
be matched with a slice of funds taken from the national general budget − most likely, 
from the state’s residual share of the PIT or the VAT revenues. Only after several 
budgetary cycles would have passed with the new arrangements can the policy be 
stabilized and more automatic transfers set up that will minimize the vertical 
imbalances and stabilize in the long run the horizontal equalization mechanisms. 
The agenda for reform has thus to be organized on several steps and put into the 
broader policy context.  
In the short run, several quick improvements are possible that will address some of 
the problems identified in the previous section. 
a) The total amount of funds distributed as equalization grants should be stabilized, 
by tying it more clearly to the total PIT yield. Right now only one component is 
defined in this way: the 16% PIT share (box 8 in Fig.2.5). The other component 
(PIT “sums” − boxes 3 and 4 in Fig.2.5) is not, though in practice it has been 
remarkably stable in the last years, at about 10% of the PIT revenues. Since 
counties can be removed from the process of allocation altogether (c. below), the 
two parts should be merged into one single equalization fund, defined as 26% of 
the PIT. Thus, no additional financial burden on the state budget will be created, 
but one fundamental condition will be met for increasing the predictability of the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
b) Vertical and horizontal equalization have to be recognized as legitimate and 
distinct policy objectives, and hence two pools of funds dedicated to each of them 
must be created, out of the 26% of the PIT defined above. (This would be 
equivalent, under the current system, with a cap imposed on the percentage 
withheld by counties for their own budget from the second source of equalization 
funds − box 8 in Fig.2.5). The total equalization funds should be split from the 
beginning of the budgetary cycle into two components: funds for counties, and 
funds for localities. No transfer of money would be allowed between them. This 
way the vertical equalization will be implemented much more coherently and no 
tier of government would siphon off funds for its own vertical compensation at the 
expense of the horizontal equalization in other tiers. Currently the counties keep 
about ¼ of the PIT “sums” (boxes 3 and 4) and 2/5 of the 16% share (box 8). In 
order to preserve the stability of expectations and the current degree of vertical 
balance, the total fund should be split into two according to the average ratio of 
1/3: of the 26% of the PIT earmarked for equalization, 8-9% would go to counties 
and 17-18% to localities.  
c) Counties can be excluded from the process of allocating equalization funds to 
localities. Their role can be very well taken over by an automatic mechanism 
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under the supervision of the central government. Right now, the counties only 
make the system unpredictable and permeable to political lobby. They have their 
own specific functions, such as coordinating regional development or supplying 
services with economies of scale larger than a local community. But none of these 
must interfere with the equalization system, which should not become an 
instrument for forcing localities into compliance with countywide objectives. 
d) After the two pools of funds are separated (a. above), the allocation by counties 
and localities of the two should be done by following strictly the fiscal capacity 
formula, so that all LGs can estimate in advance how much money they get and 
plan accordingly. Two adjustments need to be done to the fiscal capacity formula 
currently in use (see section 5.3. above): 
• Own revenues should be excluded from the calculation of fiscal power, 
in order to prevent LGs from reducing their revenue-raising effort and get 
more equalization money in return. Moral hazard will thus be eliminated. 
As a result, the only proxy for fiscal capacity of LGs remains the automatic 
share of PIT collected locally (box 6 for localities and 7 for counties), by 
capita. The exclusion of own revenues would not influence much the 
ranking of LGs by fiscal capacity, since PIT share by capita and own 
revenues by capita are two variables closely correlated. But it would 
remove the possibility of substitution: LGs do not collect the PIT 
themselves, and thus cannot adjust their behavior so as to maximize the 
equalization grants received.  
• A cap may be imposed on the per capita equalization sum, so that the 
outlayers do not receive disproportionately high amounts. The calculations 
below are done for a cap of 45 USD/capita, which is about 3 times the 
average per capita equalization grant in rural LGs.  
 
The logic of this impoved system of equalization is summarized in Fig.2.12, which 
should be compared with Fig.2.7 and 2.9 above. Its distributional effects are presented 
in Tab 2.5 below.  
 
Fig.2.12. Proposed system (I), separating vertical and horizontal equalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central government 
Counties
Localities 
 Total pool defined 
at about 8-9% of 
the PIT yield; 
formula enforced 
without exception 
 Pool defined at about 
17-18% of the PIT 
yield; formula enforced 
consistently; if 
necessary, an 
‘emergency fund’ can 
be set up to deal with 
exceptional situations 
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Contrary to the often-expressed opinion that a more automatic, formula-based 
allocation cannot take care of particular local needs, the analysis shows that the 
equalization system proposed here (I in Tab 2.5) is both simpler and fairer, at the 
county and locality levels. Simplicity is crucial, because it reduces the administrative 
costs of implementation, which is important especially when they are not immediately 
apparent but spread across many central and local public institutions. It also increases 
stakeholders’ confidence in the system, since everybody can understand how the 
system works and has little incentives to engage in rent-seeking. On the contrary, if 
rules are complicated and depend on data that are either unavailable − which is often 
the case in CEE − or easy to manipulate, the system will be perceived as unfair and 
unreliable.  
Tab 2.5 compares its results with those of the current practices, and with those of an 
alternative system (II) based on allocating the equalization pool, defined as the same 
PIT share, not on fiscal capacity but on “need” − measured by the number of 
population6. The proposal I put forward here reduces substantially the variations in 
allocation, and especially across rural LGs, where the problem is the most serious.  
 
Tab 2.5. Results of applying different equalization systems: total revenues of 
LGs, USD/cap, 2001 
 
County level Current Proposed (I) Alternative (II)
Average 17.7 17.7 17.7
Max 32.5 29.8 32.8
Min 11.6 13.1 11.6
Standard deviation / average 0.3 0.22 0.28
    
Locality level Current Proposed (I) Alternative (II)
Average 81.3 81.3 81.3
Max 782.9 741.7 785
 
 
Total Min 11.8 24.7 14.6
 Standard deviation / av. 0.44 0.37 0.42
Average 109.3 107 
Urban Standard deviation / av. 0.43 0.42
Average 53.2 55.5 
Rural Standard deviation / av. 0.61 0.47
 
More important, the proposed system produce results that are fairer than the current 
ones, by targeting better the equalizations funds towards LGs that really need them. 
This is true in the case of counties, towns and municipia and rural communes: in the 
Annex we present the allocative effects of the current system (Fig.2.13-15a) alonside 
                                                
6 One of the options currently considered in the discussions for amending the Law of Local Public 
Finances. Its main attraction is simplicity.  
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those of the proposed system (Fig.2.13-15b). It also increases exponentially the sum 
per capita transferred as the total revenues per capita before equalization decrease, 
especially in rural LGs, thus reflecting the economies of scale in providing most local 
services − general government included.  
 
On the medium and long term, depending on the pace of policy reform in 
attributions reassignment, there are some elements the government would be well 
advised to take into consideration. 
• It is important that the government resist the temptation to complicate the 
horizontal equalization system by factoring in various ‘normatives’ meant to 
function as a proxy for local needs. Once they start to go down on this road, the 
proliferation of ‘needs’ will be unstoppable and the system will become 
unmanageable (Hungary is sometimes cited as a bad example in this respect). It 
was noted above that there is a trade-off here between simplicity and transparency 
on the one hand, and technical refinement on the other. From the experience 
available so far with the current Romanian system, which is fairly simple and easy 
to understand, the biggest problem turns out to be not design, but consistent 
implementation. As long as rules are not enforced at the lower levels so that they 
create stable expectations and the right incentives, the design is practically 
irrelevant. 
• The central government should plan carefully so as to allow some degree of 
flexibility, without compromising the stability of the predictability of the 
equalization system. The intergovernmental fiscal relations in Romania concern 
about 3,000 local units; it is not possible to build it according to a predefined plan 
down to the last detail. Feedbacks from implementation should be collected and 
analyzed in order to operate corrections when the need arises. The best way to do 
this is by creating a joint grants commission with the participation of central 
government officials and Parliament staff, for reviewing periodically the 
equalization policy. When changes are proposed, all the stakeholders should be 
consulted − primarily the LGs’ associations − and sufficient time should be 
allowed for the local governments to understand them and adjust their behavior. 
As a rule of thumb, all changes should be decided at least one budgetary cycle 
before they become effective. The setting up of a grants commission can be useful 
on the long term, as more services will be reassigned to LGs. The commission 
would evaluate periodically the best way to finance locally services like education 
and health care, where reforms are not likely to be finalized soon; study the cases 
of inter-constituency spillovers from locally provided public services; develop 
benchmarks; and advise the decision-making bodies on what intergovernmental 
instruments − capitation, matching or general purpose grants − are most 
appropriate for a particular type of service.  
• As reporting procedures and databases improve, a more accurate indicator of true 
fiscal capacity of LGs can be developed to replace the current PIT/capita 
collected. However, this should remain simple and based on elements that are 
outside the control of local government officials. All the indicators should be 
easily measurable and the data put in the public domain.   
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• In the long run, when all the reassignments are completed, the situation stabilized 
and LGs accumulate enough experience in managing the new functions, the local 
autonomy can be formally increased by transforming most of the additional 
conditional grants (such as PIT shares for welfare support, price subsidies, etc) 
into general purpose transfers, preferably in the form of predefined tax shares. 
The Hunter coefficient would thus increase (Fig.2.8) and the need for vertical 
equalization will be reduced accordingly. Their allocation by LGs should not be 
based on complex normatives, but on simple and available data: for example, 
funds can be distributed on a per capita basis.  
• In a few cases transfers that are currently earmarked would be best kept tied to a 
specific service. They could be stabilized in the form of a capitation grants 
system, where the money is made conditional on a specific level of performance 
that must be achieved by local providers. Taking into account the administrative 
tradition in the region, education (and health care, if it is reassigned to LGs) is a 
sector where earmarking of funds is likely to continue. 
• Competitive grant-giving funds should replace the current discretionary financing 
of investments (roads, housing, etc) and here counties may play a role in 
administering some of them with the purpose of promoting countywide policies. 
More specifically, a matching grant system can be established to encourage 
investments in those particular projects that generate positive spillovers across 
jurisdictions. Again, the grants would act as Pigovian subsidies and contribute to 
the increasing of efficiency in production (Bird, 2000). 
• Professional financial reporting and data analysis should be introduced, starting 
with the relevant MoF units that interact with local governments. Under the 
current procedures, there is a lot of uncertainty regarding the true financial 
position of LGs, and as a result the equalization rules can be exploited by those 
who engage in “creative bookkeeping”. Elements of accrual accounting should be 
introduced and more refined reporting standards imposed, so that budgetary 
categories like “Other revenues” are reduced in size.  
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Fig. 2.5. The sharing of the Personal Income Tax (PIT, shared tax) revenues 
among tiers of government, 2002 
 
Equalization system: sums (3 + 4) and share (8).  
Counties decide the allocation of horizontal equalization funds (boxes 4 and 8); 
in theory they should use the same formula as the government in allocating PIT 
by county. Shaded boxes are those where counties can intervene in vertical and 
horizontal allocation. 
The rest of 11.5% of the PIT collected and not allocated to LGs goes to the 
central government’s budget. 
Fig. 2.6. The sharing of the VAT (national tax) in the 2002 budget  
All sums are earmarked 
Total VAT revenues (100%) = $2,746.5 mil 
1. County
(special needs)
1.3%
2. Locality
28%
Public primary
+ secondary education
(29.3%)
3. Nurseries
(localities)
0.2%
4. County/local
agro consultancy offices
0.15%
...of wich - kids
with handicap
1.5%
5. Child protection
authority (county)
1.8%
6. Protection system
persons with handicap
2%
VAT sums allocated to LGs
no formula, amount in Nat Budget
($918.2 mil in 2002 = 33.4%)
Sorin Ionita 
 
35
 
 
Fig.2.13a. Counties' revenues, current system, 2001, $
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Fig.2.13b. Counties' revenues, proposed system, 2001, $
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R 2  = 0.5569
0
2
4
6
8
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Total / cap, before equalization
Equalization sums / 
cap
 
 
 
SAR Working Papers no. 25, Jan 2003 
 
36
 
Fig.2.14a. Localities' revenues: urban, current system, 2001, $
R 2  = 0,0035
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Fig.2.14b. Localities' revenues: urban, proposed, $
R 2  = 0,5546
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Fig.2.15a. Localities' revenues: rural, current system, 2001, $
R 2  = 0,0168
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Fig.2.15b. Localities' revenues: rural, proposed, $
R 2  = 0,3597
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